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Reducing the Risk of Supply Chain 
Disruptions  
By Sunil Chopra and ManMohan S. Sodhi  
FINDINGS  
Build resilience by segmenting or regionalizing supply chains.  
Limit losses in performance by avoiding too much centralization of resources.  
In the long run, overinvesting in protection may  be more profitable than not investing 
enough.  
Most managers know that they should protect their supply chains 
from serious and costly disruptions — but comparatively few take 
action. The dilemma: Solutions to reduce risk mean little unless 
they are evaluated against their impact on cost efficiency.  
BY SUNIL CHOPRA AND MANMOHAN S. SODHI  
FOR SUPPLY CHAIN EXECUTIVES, the early years of the 21st 
century have been notable for major supply chain disruptions that have highlighted 
vulnerabilities for individual companies and for entire industries globally. In 
addition to taking many lives, the Japanese tsunami in 2011 left the world auto 
industry reeling for several months. Thailand’s 2011 floods affected the supply 
chains of computer manufacturers dependent on hard disks and of Japanese auto 
companies with plants in Thailand. The 2010 eruption of a volcano in Iceland 
disrupted millions of air travelers and affected time-sensitive air shipments.  
Today’s managers know that they need to protect their supply chains from serious 
and costly disruptions, but the most obvious solutions — increasing inventory, 
adding capacity at different locations and having multiple suppliers — undermine 
efforts to improve supply chain cost efficiency. Surveys have shown that while 
managers appreciate the impact of supply chain disruptions, they have done very 
little to prevent such incidents or mitigate their impacts.1 This is because solutions 
to reduce risk mean little unless they are weighed against supply chain cost 
efficiency. After all, financial performance is what pays the bills.  
 ABOUT THE RESEARCH  
Our ideas around the impact of underestimating the  risk of disruption and the benefits of 
containment strategies were developed based on stylized mathe- matical models and 
simulation.To compare over- and under-estimation, we analyzed a network model of a supply 
chain that could be made more resil- ient by building some reliable but high-cost facili- ties 
among other lower-cost facilities that could fail and disrupt the supply chain. Our models 
identified the optimal proportion of reli- able (but high-cost) facilities to build and then compared 
the relative losses from misestimating the disrup- tion probability.  
To understand the benefits of containment, we used a different model to evaluate the fragility or 
increase in cost of the sup- ply chain in the event of a disruption and identified the relationship 
between fragility, network connectivity and the extent of the disruption. Supply chains 
represented by connected networks where the impact of a disruption could travel across the entire 
network often had a higher fragility than networks where the impact of a disruption was more 
localized.  
Supply Chain Efficiency vs.  Risk Reduction    
Supply chain efficiency, which is directed at improving a company’s financial 
performance, is different from supply chain resilience, whose goal is risk 
reduction. Although both require dealing with risks, recurrent risks (such as 
demand fluctuations that managers must deal with in supply chains) require 
companies to focus on efficiency in im- proving the way they match supply and 
demand, while disruptive risks require companies to build resilience despite 
additional cost.  
Disruptive risks tend to have a domino effect on the supply chain: An impact in 
one area — for ex- ample, a fire in a supply plant — ripples into other areas. Such 
a risk can’t be addressed by holding ad- ditional parts inventory without a 
substantial loss in cost efficiency. By contrast, recurrent risks such as demand 
fluctuations or supply delays tend to be independent. They can normally be 
covered by good supply chain management practices, such as having the right 
inventory in the right place.  
Since the mid-1990s, managers have become much better at managing global 
supply chains and mitigating recurrent supply chain risks through improved 
planning and execution. As a result, the 1990s saw big jumps in supply chain cost 
efficiency. However, reliance on sole-source suppliers, com- mon parts and 
centralized inventories has left supply chains more vulnerable to disruptive risks. 
Although sourcing from or outsourcing to distant low-cost locations and 
eliminating excess capacity and redundant suppliers may make supply chains more 
cost efficient in the short term, such actions also make these supply chains more 
vulnerable to disruptions — with potentially damaging financial implications 
when they occur. Low-cost offshore suppliers with long lead times leave 
companies vulnerable to long periods of shutdown when particular locations or 
transportation routes experience problems.  
How should executives lower their supply chain’s exposure to disruptive risks 
without giving up hard-earned gains in financial performance from improved 
supply chain cost efficiency? Disruptions are usually well beyond a manager’s 
control, and dealing with them can affect a supply chain’s cost efficiency. To 
avoid increased costs, a manager might choose to do nothing to prepare for “acts 
of God” or force majeure. The alternative is to reconfigure supply chains to better 
handle disrup- tions, while accepting any effects on cost efficiency. In many 
instances, it is not an all-or-nothing prop- osition. Companies could elect to deploy 
different strategies in different settings or at different times. (See “About the 
Research.”)  
In an earlier MIT Sloan Management Review article,2 we considered different 
supply chain con- figurations for risk and performance. We discussed different 
mitigation strategies that companies could tailor to the type and level of risk they 
faced. To im- plement those strategies we find, broadly speaking, that today’s 
managers have two choices for achieving lower risk in the supply chain: They can 
reduce risk while also improving supply chain efficiency — a “win-win” – or they 
can reduce risk while limiting the impact on supply chain cost efficiency.  
Reduce the Risk and   Improve the Performance   Supply chains 
often comprise a huge number of products or commodities that are sourced, 
manufac- tured or stored in multiple locations, thus resulting in complexity. 
Complexity can mean reduced efficiency as managers struggle with the day-to-day 
risks of delays and fluctuations, and it can lead to increased risk of disruption, in 
which dependencies between products can bring everything to a halt. Controlling 
the amount of complexity can therefore lead to higher cost efficiency and reduced 
risk, which is a win-win. Let’s begin by considering risk.  
Managers can reduce risk by designing supply chains to contain risk rather than 
allow it to spread through the entire supply chain. The design of an oil tanker 
provides a fitting example of how good design choices can reduce fragility. Early 
oil tankers stored liquid cargo in two iron tanks linked together by pipes. But 
having two large storage tanks caused major stability problems; as the oil sloshed 
from one side of the vessel to the other, tanker ships were prone to capsizing. The 
solution was to design tankers with more compartments. Although such ships were 
more expensive to build, this approach eliminated the stability problem.  
In a similar vein, executives need to ensure that the impact of supply chain 
disruptions can be contained within a portion of the supply chain.3 Having a single 
supply chain for the entire company is analo- gous to having an oil tanker with a 
single cargo hold: It may be cost effective in the short run, but one small problem 
can cause major damage.  
In general, containment strategies are aimed at limiting the impact of a disruption 
to one part of the supply chain (in other words, like one hold in an oil tanker). For 
instance, a car company might have multiple supply sources for common parts or 
restrict the number of common parts across differ- ent car models as a way to 
reduce the impact of a possible recall or a parts shortage. We suggest two 
strategies for reducing supply chain fragility through containment while 
simultaneously im- proving financial performance: (1) segmenting the supply 
chain or (2) regionalizing the supply chain. In addition, we suggest how 
companies can design business continuity plans or respond to disruptive risk 
incidents using these strategies.  
1. Segment the supply chain. The story of Zara’s success using responsive 
sourcing from Europe is well known. Less known is the fact that as early as 2006, 
Zara, a clothing and accessories retailer based in Arteixo, Spain, was getting half 
its merchandise from low-cost suppliers in Turkey and Asia.4 What motivated this 
move to lower-cost countries? As Zara grew, it realized that producing everything 
in high-cost locations in Europe was not helping increase margins. Although it 
made sense to source the trendiest items from European factories that could 
produce them rapidly for European custom- ers, basic items such as white T-shirts 
did not justify the same level of responsiveness. So Zara began to source some 
products from lower-cost locations. In doing so, it also reduced the impact of a 
potential disruption, since not all items would be affected by a disruption in one 
geographic area.  
Large companies can segment their supply chains to improve profits and reduce 
supply chain fragility. For high-volume commodity items with low demand 
uncertainty, the supply chain should have specialized and decentralized capacity. 
For its fast- moving basic products (typically, low margin), it may be worthwhile 
to do what Zara does: Source from multiple low-cost suppliers. (See “Segmenting 
the Supply Chain.”) This reduces cost while also reducing the impact of a 
disruption at any single location, because other suppliers are producing the same 
item. For low-volume products with high demand uncertainty (typically, high 
margin), companies can take a different approach and keep supply chains flexible, 
with capacity that is centralized to aggregate demand.  
 
SEGMENTINGTHE SUPPLY CHAIN  
The supply chain can be segmented using volume, product variety and demand uncertainty. 
Higher volume favors decentralizing (with more segments), as there is little loss in economies of 
scale. But significant product variety often goes hand-in-hand with low volumes of the indi- 
vidual products, so centralizing (with fewer segments) is needed. High demand uncertainty also 
requires centralizing to achieve reasonable levels of performance.  
 
  
Even when production is centralized, the supply chain needs to be flexible to avoid 
concentrating risk in a single plant or production line. For example, to protect 
itself against supply disruption, Zara’s Euro- pean operations are set up so that 
multiple facilities can produce even low-volume items. Practically speaking, this 
level of segmentation may not be fea- sible for small companies lacking sufficient 
scale.  
W.W. Grainger Inc., which distributes industrial supplies to businesses, offers 
another example of reducing risk by segmenting the supply chain. The Lake 
Forest, Illinois-based company has about 400 stores in the United States. In an 
effort to reduce transportation costs, it keeps its fastest-moving prod- ucts at the 
stores and at nine distribution centers. However, the slower-moving items are 
warehoused at a distribution center in Chicago. This segmentation reduces 
fragility by isolating the impact of disrup- tions and creating supply backups. 
Similarly, Amazon.com Inc. has expanded its number of U.S. distribution centers 
to be closer to consumers. Like Grainger, Amazon maintains inventory of its most 
popular items in the distribution centers and tends to hold slow-moving items 
more centrally.  
Supply chains can and should evolve over time in response to product life cycles 
or experience with a new market.5 Early, when sales are low and demand 
uncertainty is high, managers can pool recurrent risk and minimize supply chain 
costs by centralizing capacity. But, as sales increase and uncertainty declines, 
capacity can be decentralized to become more responsive to local markets and 
reduce the risk of disruption.  
In addition to separating products with different risk characteristics, managers 
should consider treating the more as well as the less predictable aspects of demand 
separately. They should view such an approach not only as a way to cut costs but, 
more importantly, as a way to lessen the risk of disruption. Some utility companies 
use this approach. They employ low-cost coal-fired power plants to handle 
predictable base demand, and they then shift to higher-cost gas- and oil-fired 
power plants to handle uncertain peak demand. Having two or more sources of 
supply reduces the impact of dis- ruption risk from a single production facility.  
2. Regionalize the supply chain. Containing the impact of a disruption can also 
mean regionalizing supply chains so that the impact of losing supply from a plant 
is contained within the region. Japa- nese automakers didn’t follow this approach 
and paid a heavy price when the 2011 tsunami hit. Plants worldwide were affected 
by a shortage of parts that could be sourced only from facilities in the tsunami-
affected regions of Japan.  
Since rising fuel prices increase transportation costs, regionalizing supply chains 
provides an opportunity to lower distribution costs while also reducing risks in 
global supply chains. During peri- ods of low transportation costs, global supply 
chains attempted to minimize costs by locating production where the costs were 
the lowest. How- ever, as events like the Japanese earthquake showed, this 
approach can mean increased fragility, as the impact of any disruption can be felt 
across the entire supply chain.  
As transportation costs rise, global supply chains may be replaced by regional 
supply chains. Like those of other companies, consumer goods producer Procter & 
Gamble Co.’s supply chains were designed in the 1980s and 1990s, when oil was 
about $10 a barrel. At the time, P&G designed a more centralized production 
network with the pri- mary objective of keeping capital spending and inventories 
to a minimum. With oil prices much higher today, the most cost-effective network 
is more distributed, with multiple plants even within a single country like China.6  
In addition, growing demand in emerging economies has caused some companies, 
such as London-based Diageo plc, the world’s largest dis- tiller, to rethink their 
production and distribution networks from the ground up. In an effort to profit- 
ably increase its market share, Diageo is abandoning its global supply chain in 
favor of regional supply chains with local sourcing and distribution, often 
organized at a country level.7 Regionalizing often helps companies reduce costs 
while also containing the impact of disruptive events such as natural disasters or 
geopolitical flare-ups to a particular region. In the event that there is a problem, 
affected markets can be served temporarily by supply chains in neighboring 
regions.  
In many product categories, companies are deciding to regionalize their supply 
chains to serve even developed markets. For example, Polaris Indus- tries, a maker 
of all-terrain vehicles based in Medina, Minnesota, considered locating a plant in 
China to serve its market in the southern United States. But it ultimately decided 
to locate the plant in Mexico to save on transportation costs and allow for greater 
responsiveness. Similarly, some Chinese and Indian textile manufacturers are 
setting up plants in the United States despite the low labor costs at home. 
Although companies decide to regionalize supply chains to achieve lower costs, 
they also consequently “de-risk” their overall supply chain.  
Managers need to respond to supply chain disruption incidents when these do 
occur, but how they respond will depend on how they have configured the supply 
chain. Researchers have identified three stages of response:8 (1) detecting the 
disruption, (2) designing a solution or selecting a predesigned solu- tion and (3) 
deploying the solution.  
Given that many companies have invested in a variety of information technology 
systems for monitoring material flows (such as delivery and sales) and information 
flows (such as demand fore- casts, production schedules, inventory level and 
information about quality) to ensure performance and manage recurrent risks, 
another win-win strategy is to leverage these systems to contain the impact of 
supply chain disruption incidents by ensuring the company can react quickly to 
such incidents. Such IT systems can be a win-win: They can reduce the impact of 
risk incidents by enabling a quicker response by screening for possible disruptions. 
To leverage the benefit further, the time required to design supply chains can be 
significantly shortened if a company and its partners can develop contingent 
recovery plans for different types of disruptions in advance. Li & Fung Ltd., a 
Hong Kong-based contract manufacturing com- pany, has a variety of contingent 
supply plans that enable it to shift production from a supplier in one country to 
another supplier in a different country.  
Building on the two containment strategies described above, detection, design and 
deployment become simpler and faster when the supply chain is segmented or 
regionalized. When supply chains are regionalized, the design time and necessary 
deploy- ment time for backup supply can be reduced. Whereas a supply chain 
focused on improvements in cost efficiency may find itself without a backup in the 
event of a disruption, segmented or regional- ized supply chains are more likely to 
have backup sources for critical parts or commodities. Thus, managers with 
segmented and regionalized supply chains can design and deploy solutions fairly 
quickly in the event of a disruption. For example, the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies holds inventories of vital goods in four 
geographically separate logistics centers to facilitate responses to earthquakes and 
other humanitarian disasters in any part of the world.9 While maintaining the same 
inventory in multiple locations may seem extravagant, a less-distributed model 
would not be able to respond as quickly or efficiently. What’s more, the supply 
chain itself is more robust — in case one of the logistics centers suffers a calamity.  
Reduce Risk While Limiting the Impact on Cost Efficiency  In 
many instances, reducing disruption risk involves higher costs. In fact, the reason 
executives are reluctant to deal with supply chain risk comes from the perception 
that risk reduction will reduce cost efficiency significantly. However, managers 
can do much to ensure that loss of cost efficiency is minimal while the risk 
reduction is substantial by avoiding excessive concentration of resources like 
suppliers or capacity. And nudging trade-offs in favor of less concentration by 
overestimating the probability of disruptions can be much better in the long run 
compared to underestimating or ignoring the likelihood of disruptions.  
1. Reduce the concentration of resources. A direct consequence of making 
global supply chains more efficient and lean has been the increase in fragility. The 
billions of dollars of lost sales and costs that Toyota Motor Corp. incurred in the 
wake of its product recalls in 2010 were a direct conse- quence of a supply chain 
that relied on using a single part, sourced from one supplier, in many car models. 
Although using a common part helped Toyota reduce costs, it became the supply 
chain’s Achilles’ heel.  
Companies often manage their day-to-day recur- rent risks by “pooling” inventory 
and capacity by having fewer distribution centers or plants or by having common 
parts. More pooling reduces the supply chain cost incurred to mitigate recurrent 
(as opposed to disruptive) risks; the greater the total amount of pooling of parts 
and capacity, the greater the total benefit. It is important to realize, however, that 
pooling provides diminishing marginal benefits when dealing with recurrent risk.10 
Simultaneously, increased pooling can make the overall supply chain more 
vulnerable to disruption risk. As the Toyota case illustrates, the use of common 
parts produced by a single supplier in many models can magnify the impact of a 
quality-related disruption.  
Should managers seek to make their supply chains more lean and efficient by 
concentrating common parts and single suppliers, or should they seek to reduce 
disruptions and back off from trying to be more lean and efficient? To answer this 
question, it is important to recognize that pooling recurrent risks by, say, reducing 
the number of distribution centers,has diminishing marginal returns for supply 
chain performance while increasing the supply chain fragility and hence the 
additional risk of disruptions. When an auto manufacturer has no common parts 
whatsoever across different models of cars, building some degree of commonality 
offers significant benefits. But the marginal bene- fits grow smaller as more parts 
are made common. Conversely, going from one distribution center to two can 
dramatically reduce fragility without significantly losing too many of the benefits 
of pooling recurrent risks; this is especially true for large companies.11 (See 
“Decentralization and Costs.”) It is therefore possible to achieve an opti- mal point 
in pooling resources by way of parts commonality or fewer plants or distribution 
centers. This keeps recurrent risks low by pooling the resource and also keeps 
fragility of the supply chain low by not taking pooling to extremes.  
Thus, executives need to keep in mind that dealing with recurrent risks in the 
supply chain shifts the balance toward more centralizing of resources, pooling and 
commonality of parts, whereas dealing with rare disruptive risks pushes the 
balance in the opposite direction. Finding the right balance for recurrent risks 
requires evaluating the costs of in- creasing or decreasing inventory, capacity, 
flexibility, responsiveness and capability, and centralizing or decentralizing 
inventory and/or capacity.12 However, managing disruptive risks will require 
designing supply chains where the resource in question (say, parts inventory or the 
number of suppliers) is never completely centralized. This is why companies such 
as Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. always aim to have at least two suppliers, even if 
the second one provides only 20% of the volume.13 
DECENTRALIZATION AND COSTS  
The actual cost of a resource goes up as a result of having multiple warehouses requiring more 
inventory, while the expected impact of a disruption goes down. Going from right to left, the total 
cost decreases as we centralize or pool the resource, but the cost jumps up as we centralize 
beyond a certain point. Thus, using a single supplier or a single warehouse adds cost.  
 
The implications of these principles are obvious. When the cost of building a plant 
or a distribution center is low, having multiple facilities in different locations 
reduces the supply chain’s risks without significantly increasing costs. In general, 
this is true when there are no significant economies of scale in having a large plant 
or when having inventory in the distribution center is relatively cheap. But even 
when economies of scale are significant enough to warrant having a single source 
to address recurrent risks or the cost of maintaining inventory is high, extreme 
concentration should still be avoided due to the potential impact of disruptive 
risks. Ignoring or under estimating the possibility of disruption can be very 
expensive in the long run, as it means having all of your eggs in one basket. 
Having even two baskets, while adding to the cost, greatly reduces fragility. Each 
additional basket typically has a larger marginal cost, while decreasing fragility by 
smaller marginal amounts. However, having many more than two baskets would 
be overkill is most cases: It would cost significantly more and wouldn’t reduce 
fragility much.  
2. Nudge trade-offs in favor of reducing risk by overestimating the likelihood 
of a disruption. In a well-documented example of supply chain disruption that 
took place in 2000, a fire in a Philips Electronics plant in New Mexico interrupted 
the supply of critical cellphone chips to two major customers: Ericsson and Nokia. 
While Nokia was able to find an alternate supply source in three days, Ericsson 
lost about a month of production. Due to component shortages, its mobile phone 
division suffered a $200 million loss during that period. Nokia’s ability to regroup 
came at an upfront cost, but it paid off in terms of less disruption.  
Realistically, it is impossible to estimate the probability of a plant fire, the 
bankruptcy of a sup- plier or a faulty component. Compounding the problem is the 
human tendency to underestimate the probability of rare events the further 
removed we are from the time such events last occurred.14 Thus, supply chain 
designers and managers often underestimate disruptive risk when thinking about 
mitigation strategies. Traditional risk assessment comprises estimating the 
likelihood and the expected impact of an incident.15 In the context of disruptive 
risks, it is difficult to come up with good or even credible estimates. For example, 
there was no reasonable way for an automaker like Toyota to estimate the 
probability of a part failure or for airlines to anticipate that European airspace 
would be closed to air traffic. 
 In such settings, managers have an incentive to underestimate the likelihood of 
disruptive risks by simply ignoring them — thus avoiding the need to 
deconcentrate resources or make any trade-offs at all. After all, preparing for a 
possible disruptive risk incident requires upfront investment in risk mitigation. 
That makes it attractive for managers with fixed budgets to underestimate or even 
completely ignore the likelihood of a disruption.  
But underestimating disruptive risks, for instance, by completely ignoring them, is 
a dangerous bet. Our research using analytical models and simulation found that 
underestimating the likelihood of a disruptive event is far more expensive in the 
long run than overestimating the likelihood.16 In the event of a disruption, the loss 
incurred generally overwhelms any savings from not investing in risk mitigation 
strategies. This was clearly the case for Ericsson: Any savings it might have 
generated from having a single supplier were overwhelmed by the losses from the 
plant shutdown. In contrast, strategies designed to deal with disruption risk (such 
as having multiple suppliers) compensate for the upfront cost to some extent by 
providing some benefits even in the context of recurrent risk (for example, supply 
can be shifted from one supplier to another as regional demand or exchange rates 
shift). To be sure, investment in additional facilities to mitigate the effect of rare 
disruptions is a real cost, while the savings from avoided costs of disruptions are 
hypothetical until a disruption occurs. Nonetheless, given that even rare events 
will actually occur, the average costs from disruptions are typically much larger 
than any savings from avoiding upfront investments. Overinvesting in protection 
against disruptions may be more economic in the long run than not doing enough. 
(See “Overestimating Risk Results in Better Decisions.”)  
Moreover, one doesn’t need to estimate the chance of disruption with great 
precision. For a typical supply chain, we found that the total expected cost of a 
robust supply chain is not very sensitive to small errors in estimating the likeli- 
hood of disruption. In our simulations, an error of up to 50% in estimating 
disruption probability in either direction resulted in less than a 2% increase in total 
costs stemming from disruptive risk inci- dents over the long run. Large costs from 
future disruptions can be avoided as long as the risk of dis- ruption is not 
completely ignored. So rough estimates of disruption risk are sufficient, and over- 
estimating is better than underestimating. This knowledge should help managers 
make better trade-offs between reducing the risk of disruption and accepting 
reduced cost efficiency.  
Senior managers cannot ignore disruption risk management because effective 
solutions are unlikely to be identified and implemented at the local level. 
Executives should carefully stress test their supply chains to understand where 
there are risks of disruption.17 The goal of this thought exercise is to identify not 
the probability of disruption but the potential sources of disruption. If no risk 
mitigation strategies are in place for a particular source of disruption, a disruption 
probability of zero has effectively been assumed. This significant underestimation 
can be very expensive in the long run and should be avoided if at all possible. It is 
often cheaper in the long run to assume some arbitrary but positive probability of 
disruption rather than to ignore it.  
For large companies in particular, building resilience is often relatively 
inexpensive, and in many cases it can be done without increasing costs. 
Segmenting the supply chain based on product volume, variety and demand 
uncertainty not only increases profits; it also improves the ability of the supply 
chain to contain the impact of a disruption.  
OVERESTIMATING RISK RESULTS IN BETTER DECISIONS  
Underestimating the likelihood of a disruption results in a larger increase in long-run cost 
compared to overestimating the likelihood of disruption. However, small misestimates have very 
small consequences.  
Similarly, for many products, especially those with high transportation costs, 
regionalizing the supply chain both reduces cost and improves supply chain 
resilience. But even when implementing a risk mitigation strategy seems 
expensive, it is important to remember that in the long run, doing nothing can be 
much more costly.  
To be sure, overestimating the probability of disruption requires senior managers 
to overcome two challenges. First, they must be willing to invest in additional 
supply chain resilience even though the benefits may not follow for a long time. 
Since ignoring disruption is always cheaper in the short term, companies must be 
willing to absorb the additional costs and maintain their commitment to the addi- 
tional investment (such as a backup supplier) even when no disruption occurs for a 
few years.  
The second challenge relates to how supply chain resilience gets measured and 
implemented. A company’s leadership must convince the global supply chain of 
the benefits of overestimating the probability of disruption and must be able to 
implement global (as opposed to local) mechanisms to deal with disruption. 
Building a reliable backup source at a high-cost location may make sense globally, 
even when each location may prefer to source from the lowest-cost location. To 
the extent that the deconcentrated resources can be deployed in segmented or 
regionalized supply chains, the executive’s task of explaining any increase in local 
costs is rendered easier through a decrease in global costs.  
Sunil Chopra is the IBM Distinguished Professor of Operations Management at the Kellogg 
School of Management at Northwestern University in Evan- ston, Illinois. ManMohan S. Sodhi 
is a professor of operations and supply chain management at Cass Business School at City 
University London.  
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